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There exist two approaches in the literature concerning the multinational firm's mode choice for foreign
production between an owned subsidiary and a licensing contract. One approach considers environments
where the firm is transferring primarily knowledge-based assets. An important assumption there is
that the relevant knowledge is absorbed by the local manager or licensee over the course of time: knowledge
is non-excludable. More recently, a number of influential papers have adopted a property-right view
of the firm, assuming the application abroad of physical capital, the owner of which retains full and
exclusive rights to the capital should a relationship break down. In this paper we combine both forms
of capital assets in a single model. The model predicts that foreign direct investment (owned subsidiaries)
is more likely than licensing when the ratio of knowledge capital to physical capital is high, or when
market value is high relative to the book value of capital (high Tobin's-Q).
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown at rates greatly outpacing the
growth in world trade over the last several decades. This has naturally led to in-
creased interest in FDI by academic researchers and policy makers. Part of that
interest has been directed to the determinants of the choice of mode by which ￿rms
service foreign markets, including options such as exporting, owned foreign a¢ liates
(FDI), licensing and subcontracting, and joint ventures. This in turn relates to more
general discussion in microeconomics about the ￿boundaries of the ￿rm￿ : decisions as
to which activities should be undertaken within the ownership structure of the ￿rm,
and which activities should be contracted or outsourced to arm￿ s-length ￿rms.
There is a rich and extensive literature on the boundaries of the ￿rm, and we
can make no attempt to survey it here. Instead, we will direct our e⁄orts along lines
which have been productive in the ￿eld of international trade, where researchers have
attempted to model a multinational￿ s decision as to whether to establish a foreign
subsidiary or contract with a foreign supplier to produce a good for local sales or
for export back to the parent ￿rm. These questions used to be referred to as the
￿internalization￿problem, but more recently are being referred to by the converse
label, ￿outsourcing￿ . But they are really the same thing: whether or not to internalize
an activity inside the ￿rm, or to outsource it to an arm￿ s-length ￿rm.
Much of the more recent literature under the name outsourcing has drawn
from an approach which, we assert, focuses on properties of physical capital such as
plant and equipment. On the other hand, the empirical literature and other recent
theoretical literature has emphasized the importance of knowledge-based assets in ex-
plaining the decision to become a multinational ￿rm. An earlier theoretical literature
1under the internalization label also took the latter approach.
The purpose of this paper is to inquire whether or not the nature of the capital
required by a subsidiary makes an important di⁄erence to the choice of mode, either
subsidiary or licensee. Speci￿cally, we wish to di⁄erentiate between physical capital
and knowledge-based capital assets, and ask whether a more physical capital-intensive
￿rm will be more or less likely to chose internalization via a subsidiary rather than
outsource compared to a knowledge-capital-intensive ￿rm.
As just alluded to, the somewhat older literature assumed knowledge-based
assets and in particular assumed that the multinational ￿rm (the principal) cannot
prevent a licensee (the agent) from absorbing or learning the relevant knowledge
over time. Even though the multinational ￿owns￿ the knowledge-based asset, it
gets transferred to a licensee. This literature emphasizes the jointness property of
knowledge capital, the ability to use it fully in multiple locations at the same time
(Markusen￿ s (2002) knowledge-capital model), which leads to multi-plant production
in the ￿rst place. It suggests that the jointness properly also leads to the problem
of asset dissipation: knowledge-assets are easily transferred but also easily absorbed
by the licensee. Formal models include Horstmann and Markusen (1987), Ethier and
Markusen (1996), Markusen (2001), Fosfuri, Motta and Rłnde (2001) and Glass and
Saggi (2002).
By contrast, more recent literature is focused around the Grossman-Hart-
Moore property-right approach (Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990)), which seems (implicitly) more appropriate for physical capital in that the
relevant asset has no jointness property and that the owner of the residual rights has
full control of the asset if a relationship or negotiation breaks down. Important papers
2include Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2004), AntrÆs (2003, 2005), and Feenstra and
Hanson (2005).
Our model combines the two approaches in a simple two-period incomplete-
contracting model. A ￿rm requires both physical and knowledge capital for a foreign
subsidiary, along with non-contractible e⁄ort by a foreign licensee or manager. E⁄ort
is relatively more important as a complement to physical capital than knowledge capi-
tal, creating the well-understood advantage for using a licensee who owns the physical
capital and thus captures the full bene￿t of his or her e⁄ort. However, knowledge
capital transferred by the multinational is absorbed by the licensee during the ￿rst
period regardless of who ￿owns￿it. We assume that the value of this knowledge to
a manager or licensee outside the relationship depends on working with the physical
capital, the two assets being complements. Thus the advantage to the multinational
in owning the physical capital is that it reduces the incentives or ability of the licensee
to use the knowledge for private or outside uses in period 2.
This tension, ownership by the multinational reduces agent￿ s e⁄ort while pre-
serving the value of the knowledge capital, is the fundamental di⁄erence between
the present paper and previous ones. Our result is that ￿rms that are more physical-
capital intensive will tend to license (outsource), while ￿rms that are more knowledge-
capital intensive will tend to establish subsidiaries (internalize). We believe that this
is consistent with all available empirical evidence.
We are of course aware that some existing literature emphasizes that capital-
intensive ￿rms are more like to establish subsidiaries (AntrÆs 2003), but this refers to
capital use relative to labor and materials, not to physical versus knowledge-capital
intensity. Our model does not o⁄er cross-section predictions about mode choice as
3a function of industry or ￿rm capital-labor ratios. Rather, our predictions would
more appropriately be examined by using a type of Tobin￿ s q; speci￿cally, the ratio of
a ￿rm￿ s market value (re￿ ecting knowledge-based assets as well as physical capital)
to its book value of capital (largely re￿ ecting physical capital only). Our prediction
would be that ￿rms/industries with higher q￿ s would be more likely to establish foreign
subsidiaries. Existing evidence, reviewed in Markusen (1995, 2002) and Caves (2007)
does indeed suggest that this is the case.1 Another implication of our theory is that
when there is stronger protection for knowledge capital, the incentive for licensing
tends to be higher relative to the incentive for FDI.2
2. THE MODEL
A multinational ￿rm (MNE) in the North, denoted as M, plans to produce a prod-
uct (either intermediate or ￿nal) in the South due to cost advantages of manufacturing
there. There are two periods of production, t = 1;2, and there is no discounting. Pro-
duction in the South requires the services of a local agent/manager, denoted as A,
and two types of asset services: physical capital and knowledge capital or intellectual
property. There is an exogenous and ￿xed amount of physical capital, K, that can
1See Morck and Yeung (1991, 1992) for evidence on the importance of information-related intan-
gible assets in the FDI decision. For events in which ￿rms do transfer technology abroad, articles
by Davidson and McFetridge (1984), Mans￿eld and Romeo (1980), Teece (1986), and Wilson (1977)
show technology is more likely to be transferred internally within the ￿rm by R&D intensive ￿rms
producing new and technically complex products.
2Smith (2001) ￿nds that stronger foreign patent rights increase US ￿rms transfers of knowledge
more by licensing than by a¢ liate sales. Yang and Maskus (2001) ￿nd that countries with stronger
patent rights attract larger arm￿ s-length volumes of licensed technology, although licensing is not
compared to FDI. Maskus, Saggi and Puttitanum (2005) ￿nd that stronger patent protection in-
creases the probability of inward FDI and has very little e⁄ect on licensing; but they note that
this overall ￿nding is driven by high technology sectors, and that lower technology sectors have the
opposite result (stronger protection increases licensing more than FDI).
4only be acquired in the beginning of t = 1 and that is required for production in both
periods. Either M or A can own the physical capital K; whereas only M initially
owns the knowledge capital, with a ￿xed and exogenous amount equal to S.
At the beginning of t = 1, M makes a once-for-all choice between two possible
organizational forms: foreign direct investment (FDI) or outsourcing. With FDI, M
acquires (and owns) the physical capital used for production in the South and em-
ploys A under a sequence of one-period employment contract to manage a production
process utilizing M￿ s capital. A￿ s hiring occurs at the beginning of t = 1 and A￿ s
employment contract is re-negotiated at the beginning of t = 2. M also decides each
period how much knowledge capital to transfer to A to be utilized in production.
With outsourcing, A acquires (and owns) the physical capital, with capital acqui-
sition again occurring at the beginning of t = 1. M signs a one-period licensing
contract with A that licenses an amount s1 of M￿ s knowledge capital to A for use in
production at t = 1. This licensing agreement is re-negotiated at the beginning of
t = 2, with an amount s2 transferred at t = 2.
The cost of physical capital is rK: As in Grossman and Hart (1989), ownership
of physical capital bestows control rights on the owner. Speci￿cally, the owner can
decide the uses to which the capital can be put and can exclude access to the capital
for any other uses at any time. That having been said, e⁄ort from the agent is often
required to improve or maintain the e¢ ciency (usefulness) of the physical capital.
We shall make these points clear shortly when we specify the payo⁄ functions of the
players.
Knowledge (or intellectual ) capital, by contrast, does not have the same exclud-
ability properties. The owner of knowledge capital may not be able to control to the
5same extent the uses to which the capital is put and to capture the returns that the
Knowledge capital generates. In essence, property rights to Knowledge capital are
harder to de￿ne and protect than is the case for physical capital. We capture these
features of Knowledge capital in the following way. We assume that, at t = 1, there
exists a fraction ￿ < 1 of S that is ￿explicit knowledge￿in the sense that the uses of
this part of M￿ s Knowledge capital can be de￿ned in a t = 1 licensing agreement, they
can be measured and the returns appropriated by M. In this sense, the fraction ￿ of
M￿ s Knowledge capital can be ￿owned￿in the same way as physical capital is owned.
A fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of S is ￿tacit knowledge￿and is not contractible at t = 1 in the
sense that its current and future uses cannot be controlled by M in a t = 1 licensing
agreement and any returns that it generates cannot be speci￿cally appropriated by
M in the agreement. The value of ￿ is assumed to be exogenous to the ￿rm and can
be thought of as capturing either characteristics of the Knowledge capital utilized by
M or a characteristic of the legal regime of the country in which M is contracting.
For simplicity, we assume that all Knowledge capital is contractible at t = 2.3
Note that this set of assumptions allows a simple characterization of the environ-
ment in which M and A operate. Speci￿cally, the values of K, S and ￿ completely
de￿ne the environment ￿characteristics of the relevant industry/product ￿under
consideration. The values of K and S give the physical relative to knowledge capital
intensity of the industry while ￿ gives features of the appropriabilty of M￿ s knowledge
asset. Subsequent analysis will consider how variation in the economic environment
￿variation in (K;S;￿) ￿a⁄ects the observed pattern of outsourcing and FDI.
For any given K and knowledge asset si for i = 1;2; the maximum gross surpluses
3As it shall be clear later, M does bene￿t from withholding S in the equilibrium of t = 2; and
hence our results are still valid without this assumption.
6that accrue to M and A from utilizing K and si at t = 1 and at t = 2 are U1(K;s1)
and U2(K;s2) + V (ejK); respectively, where Ui(K;0) ￿ 0; e is A0s e⁄ort during
t = 1 that a⁄ects the return in t = 2; and V (ejK) is a concave function of e for any
given value of K:4 We allow the possibility that Ui(K;0) > 0; in which case agent
A can have alternative uses for K even if si = 0. That is, we allow the possibility
that K can either be used for producing M0s product or for some alternative purpose
bene￿ting A (e.g., K can be used for A0s private bene￿ts). We assume that producing
M0s product always yields higher payo⁄s than any alternative use when si ￿ ￿S; but
the alternative payo⁄ could be higher if s < ￿S:
There is a perfectly elastic supply of agents with opportunity cost W ￿ 0 in each
period. However, the agent not owning capital at t = 1 (M in the case of outsourcing
and A in the case of FDI) is not able to raise the amount K su¢ ciently quickly to be
able to produce alone at t = 2. This fact produces a (potential) speci￿c relationship
between M and A at t = 2:5 In this case, the t = 2 surplus is allocated based on
the Nash bargaining solution. Both A and M are risk neutral and make choices to
maximize expected income.
We also assume that, at t = 1, M has access to perfect capital markets while A has
only limited ability to borrow against future income. Speci￿cally, under outsourcing
A is only able to cover a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1] of t = 1 costs via the capital markets.
The remainder must be covered out of t = 1 revenues. As will be seen later, this
inability on A￿ s part to borrow against future income limits M￿ s ability to extract
t = 2 surplus from A via the initial licensing agreement. It also forces M to bear
4We emphsize that K is a ￿xed parameter for our model, and we include it in the payo⁄functions
so that we can see the e⁄ects of this parameter; on the other hand, both s1 and s2 are choice varialbes.
5This is relevant in the case of oursourcing, where the agent, who owns K; can demand the
sharing of returns from using S in t = 2:
7some of the costs of A￿ s capital investment.
Throughout our analysis, we shall maintain:
Assumption 1. (i) Ui(K;si) increases in both K and si for all si ￿ S. (ii) V (ejK)
increases in e: (iii) U2 (K;0) + V (0jK) ￿ (1 + ￿)W: (iv) V (0jK) ￿ W:
Part (i) of Assumption 1 is quite natural and simply states that returns are higher
with a higher amount of K or S. Part (ii) says that A0s e⁄ort during t = 1 would
improve (maintain) the e¢ ciency of physical capital K. Part (iii) ensures that A0s
payo⁄ in t = 2 from production is high enough relative to its opportunity cost (i.e.,
(iii) will be required as a sort of participation constraint): (iv) says that there cannot
be too much improvement in the value of physical asset if A exerts no e⁄ort during
t = 1:
Notice that we allow V (ejK) to be either positive or negative:6 For instance,
V (ejK) could be the depreciation (repair) cost of K in t = 2; as, for example,
V (ejK) = ￿￿rK (1 ￿ e)
2 < 0; and e simply reduces this cost. Or e could be A0s
e⁄ort to ￿nd additional use for K that adds value in t = 2: For instance, a by-product
may be produced with K; in addition to the product already being produced using
K; in which case V (ejK) > 0:7 We shall later present examples where Assumption
1 is satis￿ed.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows:
At the beginning of t = 1, M chooses between FDI and outsourcing. If M chooses
6However, if V (ejK) < 0; U2 (K;0) will need to be high enough to satisfy (iii).
7This positive V is to be distinguished from A0s using K for private bene￿ts that reduce the
return of K to M: For convenience and to capture the idea that e⁄ort is more important to improve
or maintain the usefulness of physical capital, we assume V does not depend on s: This is certainly
the case, for instance, if V represents the depreciation of K: This assumption is not essential for the
main insights of our analysis.
8FDI, then M o⁄ers A an employment contract involving payment to A of w1; if
M chooses outsourcing, M and A negotiate a contract involving a transfer to A of
knowledge capital, s1, and a licensing payment from A to M of l1. In either case,
should A accept the contract, A chooses an e⁄ort level e and M chooses the level
of knowledge capital to use (this level is determined by the licensing contract under
outsourcing). Finally, the gross surplus U1(K;s1) is realized and payments are made.
At the beginning of t = 2, M o⁄ers A a second employment contract involving a
payment w2 under FDI. If A accepts, M again chooses a level of knowledge capital
utilization for A. Surplus U2(K;s2)+V (ejK) is realized. The employment contract in
both t = 1 and t = 2 can also specify the uses to which A can put M￿ s physical capital.
Under outsourcing, M and A negotiate a second contract involving a transfer to A of
intellectual capital, s2, and a licensing payment from A to M of l2. If the contract is
agreed to, M transfers intellectual capital s2 to A, and surplus U2(K;s2) + V (ejK)
is realized: Transfers at t = 2 are determined via the Nash bargaining solution.
In all cases, the equilibrium levels of e;s1;s2 are the result of Subgame Perfect Nash
equilibrium strategy choices by A and M; and Ui is su¢ ciently large relative to K and
W so that in equilibrium it is pro￿table for M to choose either FDI or outsourcing.
3. ANALYSIS
We begin by analyzing the complete contracting case where contracting on e and
si 2 [0;S] are feasible, so as to provide a benchmark for the subsequent analysis of
the incomplete contracting situation. For the incomplete contracting case, we analyze
￿rst the FDI contract equilibrium and then the outsourcing equilibrium. Finally, we
compare equilibrium payo⁄s for M and determine the situations in which M prefers
9FDI to outsourcing.
3.1 The complete contracting case
The complete contracting solution is given as the solution to the problem
max
e;s1;s2
U1(K;s1) + U2(K;s2) + V (ejK) ￿ e (1)
Since both U1(K;s1) and U2(K;s2) are increasing in s and M can control the use of
S with complete contracting, M chooses s1 = s2 = S: The level of e⁄ort for A is given
by e￿, de￿ned by the condition
Ve (e
￿jK) = 1: (2)
3.2 Equilibrium under FDI
We begin by analyzing the equilibrium contract at t = 2. Since M owns the physical
asset under FDI, M can control the use of K at t = 2. Thus, M can prevent A from
using S for purposes other than M0s project in t = 2: Consequently, A￿ s outside option
is simply W; and, since U2(K;s2) is increasing in s2, M chooses knowledge capital
transfer of sF
2 = S: As a result, the contract that M o⁄ers A involves a payment
wF
2 = W. M￿ s payo⁄ at t = 2 is, therefore,
￿
F
M2 = U2 (K;S) + V (ejK) ￿ W:
At t = 1; M will optimally choose sF
1 = S, since U1(K;s1) is increasing in s1 and
the payo⁄ at t = 2 is independent of the value of s1. Further, since e⁄ort is costly
10for A and A￿ s compensation at t = 2 is independent of e, A will choose eF = 0.
M, recognizing this fact, o⁄ers a payment of wF
1 = W. M￿ s two period payo⁄ from
choosing FDI is thus
￿
F
M = U1 (K;S) + U2 (K;S) + V (0jK) ￿ 2W ￿ rK: (3)
We summarize this discussion below:
Lemma 1 Under the FDI option, the unique equilibrium contract pair involves: i)
transfers of knowledge capital of sF
1 = sF
2 = S, and ii) wage payments to A of wF
1 =
wF
2 = W. Under this contract, A chooses e⁄ort level eF = 0 and M￿ s equilibrium
payo⁄ is ￿F
M given in equation (3).
Note that, under FDI, the equilibrium contract is a standard wage-employment
contract. The contract allows M, via control of physical capital, to control the use
of M￿ s knowledge capital.8 The agent employee exerts no (extra) e⁄ort in improving
(maintaining) physical capital and undertakes no tasks other than those involved in
working directly for M. The ine¢ cient choice of e by A obtains because M cannot
commit to compensating A for its investment in e: As such, the contract exhibits
the oft discussed features of an insourced activity: low-powered incentives (and so
problems of lower e⁄ort) but control over asset use.
3.3 Equilibrium under outsourcing
Unlike the case of FDI, under outsourcing A now owns the physical capital while M
still owns the knowledge capital. This ownership di⁄erence impacts both the ability
8M will also require A to use K only for M0s project. Otherwise, A may use K for its own
alternative purpose, given that he receives a ￿xed wage payment.
11of M to control the use of knowledge capital and the incentives that A has to invest in
improving (maintaining) physical capital. To see the overall e⁄ect of this ownership
di⁄erence, ￿rst consider the equilibrium contract at t = 2. Since A owns the physical
capital, A can control the use of K and so can credibly threaten to use K for own
purposes. Indeed, A will choose this option unless the contract at t = 2 provides A
with su¢ cient inducement not to do so. Thus, the Nash bargaining solution at t = 2
must account for A￿ s alternative uses of K ￿these uses form A￿ s threat point in the
bargaining ￿and compensate A appropriately.
To see how the bargaining solution is obtained, note ￿rst that, if M and A fail to
reach an agreement at t = 2 and s1 ￿ ￿S, then A can use the intellectual capital not
controlled by M under the initial licensing agreement and A￿ s own physical capital for
other uses. Speci￿cally, A can use K and s1￿￿S to generate return U2 (K;s1 ￿ ￿S)+
V (ejK); through either producing an imitation of M￿ s product, or putting the assets
for some alternative purpose, or both. Of course, A can also choose not to produce
and obtain its option value W: Thus A0s disagreement payo⁄ at t = 2 is
maxfU2 (K;s1 ￿ ￿S) + V (ejK); Wg;
whereas M earns zero in t = 2 if no agreement is reached. From part (iii) of Assump-
tion 1, we have
U2 (K;s1 ￿ ￿S) + V (ejK) ￿ U2 (K;0) + V (0jK) > W:
On the other hand, the maximum joint surplus for M and A if they reach agreement
is U2 (K;S) + V (ejK):
12Therefore, at t = 2; according to the Nash bargaining solution, which splits the










U2 (K;S) + V (ejK) + U2 (K;s1 ￿ ￿S) + V (ejK)
2
: (5)
Anticipating this, during t = 1 agent A will choose e to maximize
￿
O
A2 ￿ e =
U2 (K;S) + U2 (K;0)
2
+ V (ejK) ￿ e;
and the equilibrium e under outsourcing is eO = e￿; the e¢ cient e as de￿ned in
equation (2):
Turning next to the t = 1 contract, since there is a perfectly elastic supply of
agents at t = 1 and knowledge capital is fully contractible for s1 ￿ ￿S, M captures
all incremental returns to the use of knowledge capital for s1 ￿ ￿S: for s1 ￿ ￿S, M￿ s
licensing revenues at t = 1 are U1 (K;s1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(rK + W) (recall that A can only
borrow enough against future income to cover a fraction ￿ of ￿rst-period costs. The
rest must be covered out of ￿rst-period revenues). Since U1(￿) is increasing in s1, M
will choose to license at least ￿S units of knowledge capital. Since M cannot commit
to transferring any s1 > ￿S (s1 > ￿S is not contractible) nor capture returns at t = 1
from doing so, and since M￿ s return at t = 2 (￿O
M2) is decreasing for s1 > ￿S, the
equilibrium licensing contract at t = 1 has sO




1 = U1 (K;￿S) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(rK + W): (6)
13From (5) and (6), and recalling that in t = 1 agent A receives U1 (K;￿S) but has
capital cost rK and e⁄ort cost e￿; we conclude that, under the equilibrium pair of
















￿ + U1 (K;￿S) ￿ rK
￿[U1 (K;￿S) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(rK + W)]
=




￿ ￿ rK + (1 ￿ ￿)(rK + W): (7)
Since A has an opportunity cost of 2W to work with M under the licensing contract,
in equilibrium it is required that ￿O
A ￿ 2W; which we assume to hold:




U2 (K;S) ￿ U2 (K;0)
2
+ U1 (K;￿S) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(rK + W): (8)
The results for the outsourcing contract are summarized below.
Lemma 2 Under the outsourcing option, the unique equilibrium contract pair is
l
O











The equilibrium e⁄ort choice by A is e￿. Equilibrium payo⁄s for A and M are ￿O
A
and ￿O
M given in equations (7) and (8).
Note that outsourcing generates e¢ cient e⁄ort by the agent but leads to ine¢ cient
14transfer of intellectual capital. Also, because of A￿ s limited access to capital markets,
M implicitly covers some fraction of the physical capital costs. FDI, by contrast,
leads to e¢ cient transfer of knowledge capital but shirking by the agent. Also, M
bears the full cost of physical capital. Below we investigate the circumstances under
which one option is preferred to the other.
3.4 Equilibrium Choice of Organization Form
To determine M￿ s choice between FDI and outsourcing, one need only examine the





M = [U1 (K;S) + U2 (K;S) + V (0jK) ￿ 2W ￿ rK]
￿[
U2 (K;S) ￿ U2 (K;0)
2
+ U1 (K;￿S) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(rK + W)]
= [U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S)] +
￿






￿jK) ￿ V (0jK)] ￿ ￿ (w + rK) (9)
In (9), the term U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) > 0 represents the gain from FDI due to
better knowledge capital transfer. The term
U2 (K;S) + U2 (K;0)
2
+ V (e
￿jK) ￿ W > U2 (K;0) + V (~ ejK) ￿ W > 0
represents the increased surplus accruing to M due to avoidance of hold-up un-
der FDI created by the fact that M owns the K under FDI.9 The third term,
￿[V (e￿jK) ￿ V (0jK)]; represents the loss to M due to the lower e⁄ort under FDI.
9That is, under FDI, M only needs to pay A an amount equal to W in t = 2; whereas under
outsourcing A will obtain
U2(K;S)+U2(K;0)
2 + V (e￿jK) in t = 2 due to its ownership of K and can
hold up M in demanding a higher payo⁄.
15The ￿nal term, ￿￿ (w + rK); re￿ ects the ability of M to recapture some of A￿ s
second-period hold-up rents under outsourcing by requiring A to ￿nance a portion
of (W + rK) in the ￿rst period: the higher ￿; the large this e⁄ect which makes out-
sourcing more attractive (FDI less attractive). When ￿F
M ￿￿O
M > 0, M chooses FDI;
when ￿F
M ￿ ￿O
M < 0, M chooses outsourcing.
Notice that for any given S; a lower K; or a lower K
S ; indicates an industry that
is more knowledge-capital intensive; whereas a higher K; or a higher K
S ; indicates an
industry that is more physical-capital intensive. It is simple to show that FDI will
be chosen by an industry that has a su¢ ciently low physical capital intensity (K) for
a given S. However, some addition structure is need to establish that outsourcing is
chosen by an industry that has a relatively high physical capital intensity for a given
S. We now state out main results in the next two propositions.
Proposition 1 Given any ￿xed S: (i) There exists some K1 > 0 such that when
K < K1; ￿F
M ￿ ￿O
M > 0: That is, M will choose FDI when the production (industry)




dK decrease in K and
@Ui(K;S)
@K ! 0 as K ! 1: Then,
there exists some K2 ￿ K1 > 0 such that when K > K2; ￿F
M ￿ ￿O
M < 0: That is, M
will choose outsourcing when the production (industry) is su¢ ciently physical-capital
intensive.








= U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) +
U2 (K;S) ￿ U2 (K;0)
2
+
U2 (K;0) + V (0jK) ￿ W (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿rK: (10)
16Since Ui (K;si) increase in si; we have U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) > 0; and U2 (K;S) ￿
U2 (K;0) > 0: From (iii) of Assumption 1, U2 (K;0)+V (0jK) ￿ (1 + ￿)W: Therefore,







@K decrease in K;
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h
U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) +
U2(K;S)+U2(K;0)

















is decreasing and is negative when K is su¢ ciently large, due to
@Ui(K;S)
@K ! 0 as
K ! 1: Thus U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) +
U2(K;S)+U2(K;0)
2 ￿ ￿ (W + rK) is a (strictly)
concave function that decreases when K > K0 for some large enough K0: Therefore,
since V (0jK) ￿ W ￿ 0 by (iv) of Assumption 1, there must exist some K2 ￿ K1
such that ￿F
M ￿ ￿O
M < 0 when K > K2 (or when K
S is su¢ ciently large).
Therefore, M tends to choose FDI in knowledge-capital intensive industries. Since
physical capital is relatively less important in an knowledge-capital intensive industry,
the gain from FDI due to better knowledge capital transfer is more important than
the loss due to lower e⁄ort by the agent and the saving of spending on the physical
capital. The opposite is true for physical-capital intensive industries, where M tends
to choose outsourcing. Notice that for result (ii) in Proposition 1 to hold, we need
the additional assumption that the marginal return of K is decreasing and becomes
arbitrarily small when K is su¢ ciently large, as well as the marginal return of K for
the di⁄erence U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) is also decreasing.10 This guarantees that the
gain from better knowledge transfer under FDI will be outweighed by the losses due
10For example, if the pro￿tability of an industry with requirements (K;S) is given by Ui (K;S) =
K￿S1￿￿; this additional assumption is satis￿ed.
17to poor incentive for e⁄ort and the increased spending on physical capital.
We can also say something about how ￿F
M ￿ ￿O
M changes when other parameters
of the model change, for any ￿xed K (and S): Notice that since a higher S will make
S ￿ ￿S larger, it is unlikely that U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) is lower with a higher S:
Thus, if we assume that U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) is non-decreasing in S; 11 and notice
that U2 (K;S) is higher with higher S from part (i) in Assumption 1; we will have
￿F
M ￿￿O
M higher with a higher S from equation (10). Next, again from equation (10),
a higher ￿ lowers U1 (K;S)￿U1 (K;￿S); and thereby lowers ￿F
M ￿￿O
M: We have thus
established the following:
Proposition 2 (i) Given any ￿xed K; suppose that U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) is non-
decreasing in S: Then ￿F
M￿￿O
M is higher with higher S (or with higher S
K); that is, the
relative incentive for FDI is higher in a more knowledge-capital intensive industry. (ii)
For any ￿xed K and S; ￿F
M ￿￿O
M is lower with higher ￿; that is, the relative incentive
for outsourcing is higher if a higher portion of knowledge capital is contractible at
t = 1.
For a ￿xed K; a higher S (or higher S
K) increases the relative incentive for FDI
for the similar reason given after Proposition 1: a more knowledge-capital intensive
industry bene￿ts more from better knowledge capital transfer relative to other consid-
erations. On the other hand, if a higher portion of knowledge capital is contractible,
there will be less a problem of knowledge capital transfer under outsourcing, which
increases the incentive for outsourcing, all else being equal.
To illustrate our ￿ndings, consider the following three examples.
11This additional assumption is again satis￿ed if Ui (K;S) = K￿S1￿￿:
18Example 1 Suppose that Ui (K;S) = K￿ (1 + S)
1￿￿ ; and V (ejK) = ￿1
5rK (1 ￿ 40e)
2 :
Then, part (i) and (ii) of Assumption 1 are always satis￿ed; part (iii) and (iv) are
satis￿ed as long as K￿ ￿ 1
5rK > W: Furthermore, both the additional assumption
used in part (ii) of Proposition 1 and the additional assumption used in part (i) of






= U1 (K;S) ￿ U1 (K;￿S) +
U2 (K;S) + U2 (K;0)
2
+ V (0jK) ￿ W ￿ ￿ (W + rK)
= K
￿ (1 + S)
1￿￿ ￿ K
￿ (1 + ￿S)
1￿￿ +
























rK ￿ (1 + ￿)W:
Suppose in addition that ￿ = 2
3; r = 0:5; ￿ = 0:5; W = 0:5; ￿ = 0:3; S = 1; and
K 2 [0:94;7:02]:Then, it is stragightforward to verify that K￿ ￿ 1
5rK > W; ￿F
M > 0;
￿O
M > 0; and ￿O































T 0 if K S 5:9155:
That is, corresponding to Proposition 1, K1 = K2 = 5:9155:
Example 1 illustrates our ￿ndings in Propositions 1: for a given ￿xed S; M chooses
FDI when K (or K
S ) is below some critical value, and chooses outsourcing when K
(or K
S ) is above some critical value. Notice that in this example the critical values are
the same, i.e., K1 = K2: In this example, as well as in the following two examples,
the condition that ￿O
A > 2W imposes the binding constraints on how high and how
19low the parameter value K is allowed for the model.
Example 2 Suppose that everything is the same as in Example 1 above except that































T 0 if K S 4:5922:
Thus, with a higher ￿; ￿F
M ￿ ￿O
M is lower for any given K; and K1 = K2 = 4:5922:
Example 2 illustrates Part (ii) of Proposition 2: With a higher ￿; the incentive for
FDI becomes lower relative to that for outsourcing. This is re￿ ected by the smaller
set of K for which ￿F
M > ￿O
M as ￿ increases from 0.5 to 0.7, as compared to Example
1.
Example 3 Suppose again that everything is the same as in Example 1 above, except




































T 0 if K S 10:915:
Thus, with a higher S; ￿F
M ￿ ￿O
M is higher for any given K; and K1 = K2 = 10:915:
20Example 3 illustrates Part (i) of Proposition 2: With a higher S; the incentive for
FDI becomes higher relative to that for outsourcing. This is re￿ ected by the larger
set of K for which ￿F
M > ￿O
M as S increases from 1 to 2, as compared to Example 1.
Together, our results imply that FDI is the preferred choice for M when M￿ s
product is intensive in knowledge capital and knowledge capital is di¢ cult for M to
control under a licensing agreement. When M￿ s activity is either extremely intensive
in physical capital or knowledge capital is easy to protect under a licensing agreement,
outsourcing is M￿ s preferred choice. Thus, for instance, we see the manufacturing of
standard electronics equipment such as DVD players, CD players and regular TV￿ s
outsourced as are items like Nike or Adidas athletic shoes. In all of these cases,
production is physical capital intensive and, what knowledge capital there is, is easily
controlled under a licensing agreement. But we do not see Microsoft outsourcing the
writing of its operating systems.
Our theoretical ￿ndings have potentially testable implications. In particular, both
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that ￿rms produce products that are more knowledge-
capital intensive and/or have a lower ￿ tend to choose FDI. Such a ￿rm will have a
higher return at t = 1 (U1 (K;S) > U (K;￿S)), and a lower replacement value (phys-
ical capital value plus the value of explicit intellectual capital). Consequently, such a
￿rm will have a higher Tobin￿ s q:12 This suggests a relationship between Tobin￿ s q and
outsourcing ￿￿rm￿ s with high Tobin￿ s q are more likely to be using FDI while ￿rm￿ s
with low Tobin￿ s q are more likely to be outsourcing. This prediction is supported
by some existing empirical evidence. Morck and Yeung (1991), for example, show
12Recall that Tobin￿ s q is de￿ned as
q =
market value of the ￿rm
replacement cost of ￿rm assets
:
21that controlling for explicit knowledge capital such as R&D and advertising expendi-
tures, ￿rms with more owned foreign subsidiaries have a higher Tobin￿ s q. Our theory
provides directions for further empirical studies.
Our results also have implications for the choice of organizational mode over the
product life cycle. Speci￿cally, the product life cycle is often characterized in terms of
recently innovated products being relatively intensive in intellectual assets and estab-
lished products being relatively intensive in physical assets. Under this interpretation,
a recently introduced product is one with K=S small and so it￿ s manufacturer is likely
to choose FDI; an established product is one with K=S large and so its manufacturer
is likely to choose outsourcing. Again, we have some observations of this pattern in
the data. Sharp, for instance, produces it￿ s latest ￿ at-panel and Plasma TV￿ s for Eu-
rope in an owned facility in Eastern Europe. Its standard TV￿ s and older ￿ at-panel
models are produced by outsourced manufacturers in Asia.
Markets in which technologies evolve rapidly so that knowledge capital quickly
depreciates are ones that the model also predicts should feature more outsourcing. In
this case, markets with rapid technological change will feature low values for
U2(K;S)
2 ￿
W as rents from knowledge capital decline quickly with time. As a result, the hold-
up problem that FDI solves is less severe in markets with rapid technological change.
This makes outsourcing a more attractive option. Similarly, products that require
highly skilled agents that are in scarce supply in the foreign country ￿products for
which W is large relative to U2(K;S) ￿are also more likely to be outsourced. Again,
the reason is that the value that FDI generates in terms of reduced hold up is lower
since the agent already captures a large share of second-period rents due to the high
value of W.
22To the extent that stronger intellectual property protection or contract enforcement
is likely to lead to a higher ￿; Proposition 2 further suggets that outsourcing to a
country is likely to increase as it implements stronger intellectual property protection.
Finally, note that the larger is ￿, the larger is the amount of the second-period
surplus earned by A under outsourcing that M can claim in the ￿rst period licensing
contract and the larger is the share of physical capital costs borne by A. As a result, as
￿ becomes larger, outsourcing becomes a more attractive option. Since low values of
￿ are associated with greater capital market imperfections in the foreign country, FDI
is more likely when capital market imperfections are signi￿cant whereas outsourcing
is more likely when capital market imperfections are less signi￿cant.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined how the non-excludability of knowledge capital
leads to the ownership of a complementary asset, in our case physical capital, as a
means of protecting intellectual property. The result we ￿nd is that ￿rms that are
largely dependent on knowledge capital for their returns will protect these returns by
engaging in FDI rather than outsourcing. The ownership of physical capital protects
the returns of the complementary asset, knowledge capital. The cost of this ownership
is weak incentives for ￿rm management. Firms whose returns rely little on knowledge
capital and mainly on physical capital outsource to provide stronger management
incentives.
We conclude the paper by summarizing six empirical implications of the model.
Three relate to the ￿rms and their technologies. (1) Firms that choose FDI will have
larger values of Tobin￿ s q, all else equal, than ￿rms that outsource, (2) ￿rms and
23products that are subject to product cycles are likely to use FDI early in a cycle and
outsourcing later, and (3) ￿rms in industries with rapidly developing technologies
may be more likely to choose outsourcing. Three predictions relate to host-market
characteristics. FDI is more likely chosen in markets where (4) skilled labor has a
low opportunity cost, (5) intellectual property rights and contract enforcement are
relatively weak, and (6) capital markets are relatively under-developed.
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